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CASES NOTED
solely upon whether the actiou in which the order is entered is equitable
or legal in nature. The court itself admits that "the incongruity of taking
[appellate] jurisdiction from a stay in a law type and denying jurisdiction
in an equity type proceeding springs from the persistence of outmoded
procedural differentiations."'9
ALVIN S. SHERMAN
TORTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
Plaintiff brought an action for the wrongful death of her husband
as a result of a head-on collision between the autos driven by the defendant
and the deceased. The collision occurred as the defendant approached the
deceased while the latter's auto was swerving from side to side on the
highway. Held, defendant was faced with an emergency situation and the
doctrine of last clear chance was not applicable. Burdette v. Phillips,
76 So.2d 805 (Fla. 1954).
Under the prevailing Florida law contributory negligence is a bar
to recovery.' However, the doctrine of the last clear chance mitigates
the harshness of this common law ruling, by allowing a negligent plaintiff
to recover from a negligent defendant,2 where the latter by exercising little
care could prevent or avoid injuring the plaintiff, who by his own negligence
has placed himself in a position of peril.3 The doctrine of last clear chance
is an extension of the rule of contributory negligence and is not an exception
to it., The contributory negligence of the injured party will not defeat
recovery if the defendant, by exercising ordinary care, might have avoided
the consequences of the injured person's negligence.5 When a case arises
where the facts arc not in dispute and are absolutely conclusive, the
19. Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, - U.S. , 75 S. Ct. 249,
254 (1955).
1. The doctrine of contributory negligence is not modified by statute in Florida,
and is a complete defense in an action for damage for personal injuries based on
negligence. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Frost, 76 F2d 127, 128 (5th Cir.
1935); Cornell v. First National Bank, 121 Fla. 192, 163 So. 482 (1935); Florida
Southern Ry. v, Herst, 30 Fla. 1, 11 So. 506 (1892).
2. Consumer's Lumber and Veneer Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Rv., 117 F.2d 329(5th Cir. 1943); Lindsay v. Thomas, 12 Fla. 293. 174 So. 418 (1937).
3. White v. Hughes, 139 Fla. 54, 190 So. 446 (1939). Dunn Bus Service v.
McKinley, 130 Fla. 778, 128 So. 865 (1937); Merchant's Transportation v. Daniels,
109 Fla. 496, 502, 149 So. 401 (1933).
4. Merchant's Transportation v. Daniels, 109 Fla. 496,502, 149 So. 401 (1933)
"It [the doctrine] does not permit one to recover in spite of his contributory negli-
gence, but merely operates to relieve the negligence of a plaintiff. which otherwise
would be regarded as contributory, from its character as such."
5. A.B.C. Truck Lines v. Kenemer, 247 Ala. 543, 25 So.2d 511 (1946); Gardner
v. Union Oil Co. of California, 216 Cal. 197, 13 P.2d 915 (1932); Baker v. Reid, 57
A.2d 103 (Del. 1948); Nagel v. Britthauer, 230 Iowa 207, 298 N.W. 852 (1941);
Harrison v. Eastern Michigan, Motor Bus Co., 257 Mich. 329, 241 N.W. 131 (1932);
Schaaf v. Coen, 131 Ohio St. 279, 2 N.E. 2d 605 (1936).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
application of the doctrine of the last clear chance is for the court to
determine.' On the other hand, it is well settled7 that the question of
negligence as the proximate cause of the injury is for jury determination
where the minds of reasonable men may differ.8
The Florida Supreme Court in the case of Ward v. City Fuel Co.,9
established the necessity of the defendant's appreciation of the situation
before the last clear chance doctrine could be applied. It is upon the appre-
ciation of the situation that the case under note revolves. The majority
looked to, and considered only, the act immediately preceding the impact;
namely, the deceased's swerving back into his own lane of traffic. Considered
from that point of view an emergency situation was indeed created and the
directed verdict justifiable. The majority was in error when the case is
considered from the point of view of the dissenting justices. These justices
followed the well-established approach to such problems of proximate cause;
namely, that legal or proximate cause is always dependant upon all the
facts of a particular case. The dissent stated that a jury should decide
on these facts; any other conclusion would allow the defendant "to shield
himself behind an emergency created by his own negligence."'1
In directing the verdict the court completely ignored the defendant's
duty to the plaintiff's decedent. It is accepted law in this country that if
a plaintiff is helpless, then the defendant's duty to the plaintiff begins when
he saw, or should have realized, the plaintiff's position of peril.? It
follows then that all the facts of the situation should be reviewed by a
jury to ascertain if the defendant was or was not negligent in failing to
discover the deceased's peril as lie was required to do by law. Witnesses
in the defendant's auto testified that they saw the deceased swerving. A jury
might have found, after reviewing the entire factual situation that the
defendant did breach his duty in not stopping or turning off the highway
into a parking lot, which evidence indicated was available and inviting.
The opinion of the court does much to confuse the approach to
proximate cause and the application of the doctrine of the last clear chance.
This decision departs from the established rule that proximate cause should
be considered in the light of all the facts, as opposed to a single event
6. Wright v. Los Angeles Ry. Corporation, 14 Cal. 2d 168, 93 P.2d 135 (1939);
Wheeler v. Buerkle, 14 Cal. App.2d 368, 58 P.2d 230 (1936); Shultes v. Halpin, 205
P.2d 1201 (Cal. 1949); Delsman v. Bertolle, 200 W Tash. 380, 93 P.2d 371 (1939).
7. Vhere the evidence is conflicting or inconclusive in an action based on the
last clear chance or humanitarian doctrines, the question as to whether or not the
defendant could have avoided injury to the plaintiff by the exercise of reasonable care
and diligence, notwithstanding the latter's contributory negligence, is for the jury. 65 CJ.S.
Negligence, § 263 (1950).
8. Letton v. Kitchen, 166 Ga. 121, 142 S.E. 658 (1928). Brown v. Atlantic Coast
Line Ry., 79 Ga. App. 56, 52 S.E. 2d 660 (1949).
9. 147 Fla. 320, 2 So.2d 586 (1941).
10. Florida's Last Clear Chance Doctrine, Steinhardt and Simon, 7 Mls~ir L.Q.
p. 446 (1953).
11. Wells v. Shepard, 135 Ark. 466, 205 S.W. 806 (1918).
CASES NOTED
immediately preceeding an injury, and the court by so doing, usurped the
power of the jury to decide in such cases who was or was not at fault.
If this decision is followed to any extent, Florida will have the rather
dubious honor of being the only state allowing a negligent defendant to
shield himself behind an emergency created by his own negligence. 12
FRANx J. GRENE
TORTS-DAMAGES-SURVIVAL STATUTES
The plaintiff, suing under the Wrongful Death Act' for the negligent
death of his wife, alleged as damages the loss of his wife's future earnings.
The trial judge disallowed this item of damages on the theory that the
husband had no legal right to the wife's earnings. The plaintiff then
instituted this action, as administrator, under the Florida Survival Statute,2
attempting to recover for the estate the pecuniary loss through impairment
of earning power the deceased could have recovered had she lived. Held,
there can be no recovery for prospective damage to the estate under the
Florida Survival Statute. Ellis v. Brown, 77 So.2d 845 (Fla. 1955).
At common law a person damaged by the negligent death of another
could maintain no action against the wrongdoer.3 In 1846, England passed
a remedial statute under which specified beneficiaries could recover from
a person whose "wrongful act, neglect, or default" caused the death of
another.4 Most of the so-called wrongful death acts enacted in this country
are patterned after the English statute and use similar language in fixing
the grounds upon which such damages may be recovered.5 Predominantly,
12. Lanier v. Johnson, 186 Va. 191, 42 S.E.2d 319-1 Saunders v. Temple, 154
Va.714, 153 S.E. 691 (1930).
1. FLA. STAT. §§" 768.01-.02 (1953) "Whenever the death of any person in this
State shall be caused by the wrongful act, negligence; carelessness or default of any
individual . . . and is such as would, if the death had not ensued, have entitled the
party injured thereby to maintain an action. . . . and to recover damages in respect
thereof, then, and in every such case the person . . , who would have been liable indamages if death had not ensued . . . shall be liable in damages notwithstanding the
death of the person injured .... Every action shall be brought by and in the name
of the widow or husband - . .and in every such action the jury shall give such damages
as the party or parties entitled to sue may have sustained by reason of the death of the
party killed."
2. Fi.A. STAT. § 45.11 (1953). "All actions for personal injuries shall die with
the person, to-wit: Assault and battery, slander, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution; all other actions shall and may he maintained in the name of the repre-
sentatives of the deceased."
3. Chamberlain v. Florida Power Co. 144 Fla. 719, 198 So. 486 (19-10); Wilkie
v. Roberts, 91 Fla. 1064, 109 So. 225 (1926); Mock v. Evans Light and Ice Co., 88
Fla. 113, 101 So. 203 (1924); Marianna & B. Ry. v. May, 83 Fla. 524, 91 So. 553(1922); Nolan v. Moore, 81 Fla. 594, 88 So. 601 (1921).
4. Lord Campbell's Act, 1846, 9 & 10 VrcT. c. 93.
5. Bowden v. Jacksonville Electric Co., 51 Fla. 1952. 41 So. 400 (1906); Florida
C. & P. Ry. v. Foxworth, 41 Fla. 1, 25 So. 338 (1899); Raisor v. Chicago & A. Ry.,
215 Ill. 47, 74 N.E. 69 (1905); Chicago v. Major, 18 I11. 349, 68 Am. Dec. 553 (1857);
Kelliher v. New York C. & H. R.R., 212 N.Y. 207, 105 N.E. 824 (1914); Alfson v.
Bush Co., 182 N.Y. 193, 75 N.E. 230 (1905).
